



Medical malpractice suits consume time, money and energy. They strike fears of nightmarishly lengthy, complex 
litigation in the minds of health care providers. Ill or injured patients filing such suits feel wronged, unsure of what 
really happened and desperately seek justice and compensation. The current tort system with jury trials, in place in 
America for over 200 years, is cumbersome, slow, and yields often unpredictable results. Establishing working 
judicial standards of what constitutes malpractice in specific clinical situations is difficult in the existing system.  
Specialty health care courts have been proposed as an alternative. In this paper, I look at the scope of the current 
problem in terms of numbers of suits, costs – both economic and non-economic – and the reality of the current 
system versus what it is supposed to do. Who currently benefits and which injured parties are left behind are 
discussed, as are jury limitations. Other examples of specialty courts, such as Delaware’s Court of Chancery for 
business and the Workman’s Compensation system, will be discussed as precedents for an analogous system for 
health care. This lays the foundation for a rationale for healthcare specialty courts and a discussion of some 
proposed systems. Advantages and disadvantages of health care courts are reviewed. 
Scope of the problem 
Frequency of suits and effects on practice 
The American medical liability system is a huge 
system in terms of size and cost. Estimates of 2008 
dollar costs were approximately $55 billion,  including 1
not only direct payments and legal expenses but also, 
more importantly, so-called “defensive medicine,” 
which is medicine practiced in a manner that may not 
be cost-effective or efficient but which helps avoid 
liability by, among other things, ordering diagnostic 
tests to “rule out” conditions. Defensive medicine 
specifically involves a focus on anticipating legal 
liability and trying to protect against it. It has become 
the de facto “standard operating procedure” in most 
American practices because medical malpractice 
liability concerns are so commonplace and the threats 
are real. According to a New England Journal of 
Medicine study from Harvard that was published in 
2011, physician risk of lawsuit averages 7% per year; 
specialties such as general surgery average 16%, and 
pediatrics, 3%.  A study by Seabury indicated that 2
physicians on average spend 11% of their forty-year 
career with an open malpractice claim, some much 
more.  It is estimated that a physician is likely to be 3
sued several times in his career. Such suits take years 
to resolve and carry heavy financial as well as 
emotional costs for both defendant and plaintiff.  Such 4
lawsuits are the specialty focus, or at times, the sole 
focus of many firms. Advertising by firms is quite 
commonplace and permeates television, billboards, 
and phone directory advertising. Lawyers generate the 
largest number of telephone directory ads, and many 
of those are personal-injury-related. Most western 
industrialized nations, including Canada, do not have 
the medical liability volume in absolute or relative 
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terms that the United States does. Despite current suit 
volume, it is believed that the number of suits filed is 
actually only a small fraction of those that could be 
filed for injury due to negligent treatment. 
Insurance costs and effect on physician 
supply 
Liability insurance premiums for physicians, 
especially for certain high-risk specialties such as 
obstetrics and neurosurgery that are highly affected by 
medical liability lawsuits, impact physician supply. 
Any attempt to measure reforms or improvements to 
the system must look at the effects on quality of care, 
indemnity payments, litigation administrative costs, 
liability insurance costs, defensive medicine impact, 
and physician supply.  5
Medical liability premiums vary widely and are 
usually related to the medical liability climate and risk 
of a particular specialty and region. In a 2011 survey, a 
general surgeon paid $190,926 in Dade County, 
Florida, $15,300 in Fresno County, California, and 
$11,306 in Minnesota. An obstetrician paid $201,808 
in Nassau County, New York, $15,484 in Fresno 
County, California, and $22,486 in North Dakota.  6
The California Medical Injury Compensation Reform 
Act (MICRA) is believed to have lead to lower rates in 
California compared to other states,  but rates in 7
California vary widely within the state. For example, 
general surgeons in Los Angeles and Orange County 
paid around $45,000 in 2010.7 
The reality of suits vs. the ideal  
The main purpose of a medical liability system is to 
compensate those who are injured due to wrongful 
acts, usually negligence, and to act as a deterrent and 
disincentive toward such acts so that practitioners act 
thoughtfully, skillfully and carefully.  8
What percent of injuries come to suit? 
The reality of the current system, however, is that 
many injured individuals are uncompensated or 
undercompensated and some plaintiffs are 
overcompensated. The entire process is often an 
unwieldy, drawn-out affair that takes years to resolve. 
It is estimated that only about 1% of medical injures 
due to negligence actually result in law suits, based on 
the Harvard Medical Practice Study of 30,000 charts 
from 51 New York State hospitals published in 1991.  9
A key factor in why few suits are filed relative to the 
number of injuries that exist from acts deemed 
negligent in retrospective reviews is that it is often 
very difficult for patients to determine what was an 
injury from a negligent act versus just misfortune and 
known risk.  While “standards of care,” the measure 10
by which negligence is determined, can be defined in 
general terms, they are very difficult to practically and 
neatly define in many complex clinical situations. A 
litigious climate also makes most physicians leery of 
discussion of medical errors, mishaps and “near-
misses,” so patients may know little about what really 
happened. 
Suit length 
Suits average about 3 years but can last much 
longer. ,  Suits are often not brought on until a year 11 12
or more has passed from the time of injury, so the 
time to adjudication can be, in many cases, five years 
or more during which the patient has no payment. 
Suit volume and future effect of health care 
changes  
The volume of malpractice claims while having 
steadily grown in the last half-century, then leveled off 
to an estimated 15 claims per 100 physicians per 
year11 but later dropped since the early 2000s.7 The 
size of awards, however, has continued to rise, 
doubling in real dollar cost from 1990 to 2001, but has 
leveled off at around $200,000 median indemnity 
payments from 2002-2013.7,9 Paid claims frequencies 
have decreased for physicians since the early 2000s, 
dropping from 19 to 10 claims per 1000 MD 
physicians and 12 per 1000 for DO physicians.7 High-
end awards have also plateaued. Reasons for the 
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plateau in payments and drop in frequency of claims 
are complex, debated and uncertain,7 but the numbers 
indicate the “malpractice litigation” crisis atmosphere 
of the 1970-early 2000’s has cooled.  Simplistically 13
put, the situation is now “less bad,” but not good. 
Healthcare policy and healthcare insurance coverage 
have changed the manner in which patients receive 
care compared to ten or more years ago. Lower 
physician reimbursement rates related to overall 
health care cost growth have resulted in a greater 
percentage of patients being cared for by ancillary 
healthcare practitioners such as physicians’ assistants 
(PAs) and nurse practitioners (NPs). NPs and PAs cost 
less than doctors to employ but get paid close to the 
same reimbursement (80%) by insurance companies. 
Care by less experienced practitioners, such as these 
“mid-level providers,” as they are sometimes known, 
who lack the same degree of training and experience 
as physicians, is likely to result in greater, rather than 
lesser, numbers of medical negligence claims. 
Ultimate liability still typically refers back to 
physicians employing those PAs and NPs under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.* Even when care is 
provided directly by physicians, however, it is 
common knowledge that the amount of time 
physicians spend with patients has been diminishing 
in the past several years. Less time spent taking a 
history and examining a patient can result in a higher 
rate of problems being overlooked and hence higher 
rates of litigation if there is a bad outcome. In 
addition, partly because of reimbursement factors, 
many physicians who have an office practice no longer 
take care of their hospitalized patients, leaving this 
work for hospital-based specialists (“hospitalists”). 
Hospitalists do not have the benefit of knowing the 
patient in advance and developing a rapport with 
them. While there are certain logistical efficiencies in 
having hospital-based physicians taking care of 
hospital patients, there also is a loss of continuity and 
a greater chance of communication errors between 
separate outpatient and inpatient doctors. The result is 
a greater chance of medical issues “falling through the 
cracks.” Such situations are often fertile ground for 
more, rather than fewer, malpractice suits and patients 
are more likely to sue physicians with whom they do 
not have a long-term relationship. 
Economic costs: claim payouts and legal 
expenses 
The average indemnity payout in a study of claims 
from 1985-2008 from the Physician Insurers 
Association of America (PIAA) database9 for so-called 
low risk medical specialties such as family practice 
and pediatrics was $267,000 vs. $315,000 for high-risk 
medical specialties (like surgery and obstetrics). Most 
cases settle; only 7% go to a jury.  Of those that go to 14
a jury trial where the finding is for the plaintiff, jury 
verdicts offer a median award of $1.2 million.  15
Monies that actually go to the plaintiff are often only 
about 50% of the court award, with the rest going 
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towards legal fees and other administrative expenses.
11,  16
*Doctrine that employer is responsible for negligent 
action of employees committed in course of their 
employment duties. 
Emotional and other non-economic costs 
The emotional costs are much harder to quantify but 
are very real. They overshadow the work of doctors, 
undermine their confidence, and hinder effective day-
to-day relationships with patients. Medical 
malpractice actions often haunt defendants daily. 
Some physicians come to see patients as potential 
adversaries and see clinical interaction as risk-ridden 
opportunities, precipitating defensive medicine 
practices. Risk-averse behavior by doctors can 
sometimes work to the detriment of their patients. 
Obviously, this is highly dependent on the 
practitioner’s circumstances. There is a common 
expression in medical malpractice defense that “even 
when you ‘win,’ you lose,” because of the tremendous 
time and energy spent in defending actions and the 
fact that doctors’ reputations are often impaired after a 
malpractice suit, even if the defendant prevails, as the 
knowledge of the allegation often lingers for much 
longer than the knowledge of a not-liable verdict. In 
addition, it is possible for physicians to lose their 
liability insurance even if they ultimately prevail in an 
action: they may be dropped by an insurer due to the 
number of claims being filed even if no liability is ever 
found, since those claims cost substantial sums to 
defend. 
Effects on physician manpower and 
specialty choice 
In most states, since liability insurance is required to 
practice medicine, physicians who lose it are in a 
difficult bind. Their choices include going out of 
clinical practice, working in an administrative 
capacity, or leaving private practice and going to work 
for a hospital or institution that has an institutional 
“blanket policy.” The availability and affordability of 
liability insurance can shape the distribution of 
physicians by location. It is possible to pay more than 
$200K per year for liability insurance as an Ob-Gyn. 
These numbers have an effect on physician practice 
and availability in communities. For example, many 
Ob-Gyn physicians have simply stopped doing Ob 
work. Additionally, the cost for neurosurgeons is so 
high that many communities have difficulty recruiting 
them. States that have enacted reforms to try to 
diminish costs and the likelihood of suit, as a 
corollary, have seen an influx of physicians. After 
passing broad tort reform legislation in 2003, Texas, 
by 2013, had seen its number of physician grow by 
100%, a rate double that of the general population 
growth. Its insurance premiums have fallen 60% in 10 
years. What’s more, many of those physicians coming 
to Texas relocated to it after leaving NY, where liability 
insurance rates rose 60% in the same time period.  17
Costs such as these truly have profound and diverse 
consequences. 
Jury limitations 
Approximately seven percent of medical malpractice 
cases go to trial. When a case goes to trial, the plaintiff 
must show, in the case of negligence, that the 
defendant had a duty that was breached, that the 
breach was the actual and proximate cause of injury, 
and that damages resulted. Typically, large amounts of 
scientific and medical evidence are presented. Each 
side hires and pays its own medical experts who 
possess knowledge the average juror would not have. 
Not surprisingly, each side’s experts present evidence 
favorable to their side. Jurors must evaluate conflicting 
testimony to come to a conclusion as the “trier of 
facts” (i.e. determiner of truth) and, not surprisingly, 
jurors may be left confused.  
The question arises as to whether jurors, who typically 
are chosen for their lack of special knowledge, have 
sufficient knowledge to adequately weigh specialist 
scientific and technical evidence presented with 
conflicting interpretations. Can jurors adequately 
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determine which expert’s testimony is more credible 
than the other on a scientific basis? Are they able to 
critically evaluate the experts’ credentials? Can they 
separate “real” science from “junk science?”.  18
Part of the problem of why a jury system is 
problematic is how experts are selected. An expert is 
typically chosen by each side long before trial by being 
asked to give a verbal opinion in private. If the 
opinion is not favorable to that side, they then try 
someone else. Thus there is a tendency of “shopping” 
for an expert. As experts are pre-selected for their 
opinion, it therefore is not surprising that at trial, 
different conclusions are reached by each side, 
different standards applied, and different emphasis 
applied to the same set of facts. Consequently, lay 
juries have a hard time sorting these opinions. 
When presented with a bewildering array of 
conflicting evidence, a jury of laypersons may fall back 
on judgments fashioned on personality and emotion 
rather than facts. Stephen Sugarman, a Berkeley law 
professor, points out that “jurors selected in part for 
their ignorance about the topic” are asked to decide 
“extremely difficult scientific issues.”18 Sugarman 
refers to a 1985 California case against Johnson & 
Johnson. The plaintiff ’s alleged injury from a toxic 
shock syndrome infection acquired while using a 
tampon won her $500 million in compensatory 
damages and $10 million in punitive damages. The 
trial judge concluded that the plaintiff had not 
presented sufficient evidence of economic loss to 
justify the damages and that the jurors acted with 
passion and prejudice. 
Juror critics contend that when jurors lack scientific 
skills to make sense of evidence, they may resort to 
alternative means to make a decision. For example, 
jurors may rely upon sympathy for the plaintiff, 
especially in cases of serious injury or death. They 
may neglect to question the defendant’s responsibility 
in contributing to their injury, and they may focus on 
wanting to help the plaintiff even if the defendant may 
not have been the cause of injury, or the injury was 
unavoidable or unpredictable. 
Due to the “collateral source” rule, jurors are supposed 
to make decisions and awards irrespective of whether 
the plaintiff has insurance coverage for the damages. 
Jurors by law are not supposed to be told if the 
defendant had insurance coverage concerning the 
services provided to the plaintiff. In reality, the jurors 
almost always know that such coverage is typically 
required and exists. They therefore know that 
insurance rather than the defendant will likely pay 
awards to the plaintiff, which may influence the 
likelihood of an award being made. Professor 
Havighurst of Duke writes,  
Although it is customary in an adversary 
system to regard a jury trial as ‘black box’, the 
outcomes of which (on non-legal questions) are 
granted a powerful presumption of legitimacy, 
realism compels recognition that juries are 
often poorly positioned to choose reliably 
between the well-argued, but often highly 
confusing, theories of the two sides’ experts. As 
a result, they often fall back on such 
irrelevancies as the witnesses’ demeanor and 
style of presentation or sympathy for the 
plaintiff ’s plight or the defendant’s reputation.  19
Professor Neil Vidmar of Duke takes issue with the 
assumption that juries are poorly capable of arriving at 
rational logical decisions in technical matters.15 He 
cites evidence from studies conducted by Mark 
Taragin analyzing 8,231 New Jersey cases between 
1977 and 1992.  In those studies, physicians’ non-20
discoverable assessments of liability were compared 
with the jury verdicts. Cases were classified as 
defensible, indefensible, or unclear regarding the 
standard medical care, and they were also classified 
according to the severity of injury. There was a 
substantial correlation between insurance company 
evaluations of liability and jury verdicts. Plaintiffs won 
21% of cases deemed defensible by expert panel but 
91% of the cases deemed indefensible by insurance 
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company physicians. In “unclear” cases, plaintiffs won 
59% of the time.20 Another later study of 1,452 
malpractice claims from five different insurers in 
different parts of the country came to a similar 
conclusion after independent physician review,  but 21
those reviewers were not blinded as to which plaintiffs 
got payment. In this study, the likelihood of medical 
error was graded from one to five. In cases where 
there was “little or no evidence” of medical error, the 
plaintiff prevailed 19% of the time, and in cases where 
there was a high level of evidence of medical error, the 
plaintiff prevailed 84% of the time. In “close call” but 
less than 50-50 chances, the plaintiff prevailed 52% of 
the time; in “close call” but greater than 50-50 chance, 
the plaintiff prevailed 61% of the time.21 Thus the 
margin of error is still sizable, but jurors get it right 
most of the time compared to expert reviewers.  
It is also argued that jurors, by only hearing one case, 
lack the experience of multiple cases in which to judge 
liability and evaluate evidence. While the same 
criticism can be weighed in all jury trials, it appears 
particularly relevant in medical malpractice trials 
since the cases involve judgments that go beyond day-
to-day experience. If the persons weighing evidence 
had greater experience, the ability to judge more 
accurately would be strengthened. Juries typically do 
not receive instruction in how other cases have been 
handled or decided in terms of either verdict or 
damages and essentially work in a vacuum of that 
case.  22
In medical malpractice litigation, as in other torts 
(civil, non-criminal wrongs), the goal is to provide 
equitable treatment under similar circumstances to 
similar individuals in different trials. An additional 
goal should be to provide similar treatment for similar 
degrees of injuries in different cases. The current 
system does not do this well. While malpractice claims 
with a dubious basis are commonly filed, there also are 
many real injuries that go uncompensated and 
unrecognized as malpractice.13,21,  23
Proposed solutions 
Those who feel that the existing jury system falls short 
have proposed specialized malpractice courts. 
Specialized courts are by far not the only solutions 
proposed. So called “tort reform without special 
courts” has been proposed, which includes the 
following ideas: 
• a) barriers to bringing suits such as prescreening 
panels, certificate of merit requirements, expert 
witness certification, and limits on attorney fees 
•  b) limiting compensation (caps for non-economic 
damages) 
•  c) changing how damages are paid such as periodic 
vs. lump sum payments, and eliminating “joint and 
several liability*.”7,  24
*Joint and several liability is the concept that each 
defendant is responsible for paying a judgment if 
other defendants do not have the means to pay, 
irrespective of the proportion of liability that the party 
that is able to pay. It favors plaintiffs where one of the 
defendants has “deep pockets.”   
Success of these reforms has been limited. A recent 
review by Mello et al. in JAMA concluded that 
“controlled studies encompassing 50 states suggest 
that on average, these approaches are associated with 
reductions in claims payment by 20-30% but have 
only a modest relationship with insurance 
premiums.”7 
Non - t r a d i t i on a l l i ab i l i t y re for ms i nc lu d e 
“communication and resolution” programs in which 
providers (usually large medical centers) discuss 
unfavorable and unanticipated outcomes with patients 
and families before litigation is raised or threatened 
and may offer compensation in a non-legal 
proceeding. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss these programs in detail, but they were co-
pioneered by the Lexington, Kentucky VA and the 
University of Michigan Hospitals, and can have a 
niche role in liability reforms in selected large centers 
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where all or most physicians are employees of the 
involved institution.7,12,24,  While providing 25
transparency and closure, these programs also have 
some pitfalls. These programs are not feasible for 
individual or small practice providers. Insurers may 
try to recoup third party insurance payments made on 
behalf of patients for care, if the patient receives 
compensatory funds through such non-litigation 
means after an adverse event, which may thus negate 
the value of such compensation delivered via a 
communication and resolution process outside the 
legal system to the patient.13 
Specialized courts rationale 
Specialized courts can potentially obviate the 
problems discussed earlier. Specialized courts with 
narrowly focused jurisdictions offer judges with 
special knowledge and experience in certain areas of 
law and handle only certain types of cases in 
contradistinction to general courts, which handle a 
wide gamut of cases. 
Expected benefits are: 1) improved and more precise 
decision making due to greater judicial knowledge 
and expertise in areas of complex subject matter, and 
2) reduced case backlog and faster adjudication.  In 26
contrast to general courts, supplying extensive, 
specific background material might be unnecessary to 
specialist courts, where such knowledge is already 
assumed on the part of officers. This could save time 
and reduce costs. Greater knowledge and familiarity 
with similar cases can also result in greater uniformity 
and consistency of decision-making. Greater 
familiarity with subjects facilitates better case 
management, in terms of setting realistic and practical 
time frames for task goals in a trial. Greater 
uniformity of court decisions can also result in 
diminished benefits from so-called “forum shopping,” 
wherein plaintiffs look for a court or jury venue where 
the climate will be more favorable to their position.26 
There are many precedents for specialized courts in 
the United States including Bankruptcy Court, Tax 
Court, Juvenile and Family Court. 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery, established in 1792, is 
an example of a very well established, successful, 
nationally recognized specialty court based on the 
English Court of Chancery, an equity court. Delaware, 
although small with a population of under one 
million, has the largest percentage of large-company 
incorporations of any state in the nation. One reason 
for this incongruity is the Delaware Chancery Court, 
which deals with corporate governance issues such as 
mergers and acquisitions, derivative shareholder 
actions, and other complex corporate litigation where 
specialized knowledge and experience is accorded 
great value. Corporations come to Delaware to be 
incorporated because of their satisfaction with this 
system and the extensive case law precedents set by 
this administration. There are few judges, known as 
Chancellors, and hence each is involved in a large 
number of cases and has broad commercial 
experience. 
Other states have imitated Delaware in creating 
Chancery Courts, including Illinois and New Jersey. 
Health care court proposals 
Due to problems with juries, technical demands of 
dealing with scientific evidence, and cost and time 
considerations, alternatives to juries have been 
proposed in several forms, notably the AMA’s 1988 
proposal.  The AMA proposal involved several levels 27
of independent medical review to determine merit. 
Initially, a pre-hearing application screening is 
performed to preliminarily evaluate merit. For claims 
with perceived merit, the case is sent to a specialty 
expert physician to further judge merit and help the 
patient evaluate a settlement offer. If not settled, the 
case then goes to a “hearing examiner” who makes a 
determination and assesses damages. A unique feature 
is that blind settlement offers are required pre-hearing 
medicalreview.columbia.edu Col Med Rev 1(1);10-22 25 May 2015
COLUMBIA MEDICAL REVIEW
by each side: if defendant offer is greater than 
plaintiff ’s request, the case settles; if not, it goes 
forward.22 To discourage rejecting reasonable offers, if 
a hearing produces a lower award than the other side 
previously offered as a settlement pre-hearing, the side 
that rejected the offer may be subject to sanctions.27 
The plaintiff is provided with a Medical Board funded 
attorney free of charge. Appeals are heard by a three 
member Medical Appeal Board. Appeal of the Medical 
Board decision in turn is to the State appellate court, 
but appeals are limited to issues of whether the board 
followed its own rules in arriving at its decision. The 
AMA proposals never were implemented or achieved 
much acceptance, but the concept of health care 
courts continues to attract interest. Common Good, 
founded by lawyer Philip Howard in conjunction with 
the Harvard School of Public Health, also proposed a 
health court system.4 The Progressive Policy Institute, 
linked to Common Good, has a related plan.11 
Health care court concepts typically eliminate juries. 
Decision-making is instead vested in special judges 
with scientific/medical training. In the AMA and 
Common Good plans, experts are chosen by the court 
rather than by each side so that there are no 
competing experts each with an allegiance to one 
side.11 
In the health care court strategy, there is no civil jury 
and instead the judge is the one who evaluates the 
evidence and judges its truthfulness. The judge listens 
to one set of presumably “neutral” experts. The expert 
judge would have a better ability to evaluate the 
evidence than a typical juror would.4 
Appeals in the Common Good and Progressive Policy 
Institute health care non-jury court proposal are to a 
special “Health Care Appeals Court.”  
Medical malpractice cases, in order to be proven, 
require a demonstration of a violation of a standard of 
care by the defendant. In a health care court, 
standards of care could be set as procedural matters by 
the judge more specifically than the current “generic” 
definition of standard of care, which is what a 
physician with the usual skills exhibited by a 
reasonably prudent member of the profession would 
do under similar circumstances. In traditional courts, 
the standard of care is often presented differently by 
each side. With the target more firmly defined in a 
specialty court, the ability of the court or 
administrative body to determine if there indeed has 
been a violation of the standard of care would be more 
easily achieved. 
Compensation schedules for various injuries could 
also be established by special healthcare courts, so 
there would be greater uniformity in compensation 
for similar injuries to different persons. Of course, no 
two cases are completely alike and some discretion 
would still need to be exercised, but compensation 
schedules would establish some benchmark in place of 
the current system where wide variances exist.4 
Advantages of health courts 
Judicial and legal efficiency 
Medical malpractice litigation is complex with much 
technical detail. Delegating these cases to a  special 
court honed in such areas unburdens the general 
court from such subjects. The special court is likely 
better and more quickly able to negotiate the 
difficulties of such litigation due to its experience.26 
Judicial expertise 
Specialized judges would, by nature of the narrow 
scope of their work, have greater expertise. They 
would likely be better at evaluating scientific evidence 
and less dependent on experts to formulate a 
judgment. 
Uniformity of decision making 
Special courts, staffed with a smaller number of judges 
and tasked with one specialty, are more likely to have 
greater uniformity of judgment and rulings. 
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Predictability of judgment for a given set of facts 
would be an advantage.  
Avoid forum shopping 
The existence of a specialized court, by creating 
greater uniformity of judgment and application of law, 
is likely to diminish forum and jury demographics 
shopping. Certain venues such as Philadelphia, 
Brooklyn, NY or the Bronx, NY are favored by 
plaintiffs because of the lower income jury pool from 
which they draw, which is felt to favor the plaintiff in 
an injury case. 
Larger number of injury awards but smaller 
size of average awards  
The current jury system of malpractice litigation 
results in few compensated patients. This may in part 
be because only a small percent seek to pursue 
litigation or even know if there has been a possible 
malpractice committed.23 Part of this is because it is 
difficult and costly to initiate a law suit. The AMA, 
Common Good11 and Progressive Policy Institute 
systems are similar to Workman’s Compensation 
whereby a claimant starts by filling out a simple form, 
which would not necessarily require a lawyer and 
would be far simpler than filing a law suit. This would 
then go to an administrative board for preliminary 
evaluation. The use of compensation tables and the 
lack of unpredictable juries as the claim moves 
forward would likely make average rewards smaller 
for individuals, but at the same time allow a 
significantly larger number of injured patients to be 
compensated with fewer hurdles.9,12,22 
Greater coordination of compensation 
benefits to injured parties 
The existing general court system is not well-suited to 
administering the distribution system of payments 
over the lifetime of an injured party. Most settlements 
or awards are not structured to provide for ongoing 
care of an injured individual over his remaining 
lifetime. A lump sum award, typical in most courts, is 
often left to the plaintiff ’s management. A specialized 
health court may be better able to coordinate and 
administer extended care compensation plans, 
organizing facets of care among insurers, hospitals 
and other health care providers. This may be 
analogous to Family Court being better able to 
manage domestic matters. This would help avoid 
situations where a plaintiff, because of poor planning, 
might run out of money several years after the award 
and then become dependent on public resources.22,26 
Establishing judicial parameters for 
standards of medical care and typical levels 
of compensation   
Healthcare courts, could, over time, establish 
precedents regarding standards of care for given 
medical services under a variety of scenarios. This in 
turn could set both plaintiffs’ and doctors’ 
expectations concerning what is and is not 
malpractice, a task the existing system does not do 
well.4 They could facilitate the development of 
databases concerning patient injury to encourage 
open and accessible knowledge of injuries and to 
develop patient safety protocols. The current system of 
(often) sealed settlements discourages dialogue and 
shedding of light.12 Improved patient safety is not 
currently as prominent of a side benefit of medical 
malpractice suits as it should be. Contrast this with 
the airline industry after an accident—public scrutiny 
is probably one reason for the difference as well as the 
scale of the injury.  
Disadvantages of health courts 
Perceived lack of jury as being unfair 
While the value of not having a jury has been 
discussed, the public perceives disadvantages of jury-
less trials. Americans are accustomed to jury trials, 
typically seen as friendly to the “little guy” and as 
more sympathetic to the injured plaintiff than an 
administrative panel or judge. The potential chance 
for a large award may be seen as substantially greater 
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with a jury than with a judge. In most malpractice 
litigation cases, the plaintiff insists on a jury trial for 
that very reason. As discussed earlier, juries have been 
criticized for their lack of experience in dealing with 
medical malpractice litigation, lack of technical 
knowledge, and ability to be swayed by emotion when 
unable to make a decision on scientific grounds. Jury 
fairness remains a debatable issue. 
Challenges to constitutionality 
The seventh amendment to the Constitution 
guarantees jury trials for matters over the amount of 
$20, but this only pertains to Federal courts, not State 
courts, which is where most medical malpractice 
actions are heard. Disputes involving private health 
insurance plans covered by the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) are 
heard in Federal court, and there are no jury trials 
allowed. There is therefore a well- established 
precedent for non-jury trials in medical error matters. 
Thus, a challenge to the constitutionality of non-jury 
trials would ultimately fail, but culturally it is deeply 
ingrained in our custom. 
Chance for special interest groups to have 
undue influence  
A health care court, with a select number of judges 
and a limited group of qualified attorneys who are 
likely to appear repetitively, leaves the potential 
opportunity for courtroom bias by judges who 
become very familiar with the attorneys practicing 
before them.26 Attorneys also gain an advantage by 
getting to know the judges well and learning what 
works and does not work with them, which can lead 
to an advantage for those practitioners appearing 
before the court. This is possible in other existing 
specialized courts, as well. Finally, there is a chance for 
special interest groups, such as bar associations, 
hospitals unions, and liability insurers to exert undue 
influence on the selection process for such judges. 
Limited number of courts and locales 
Specialized courts would almost always be less 
plentiful than general courts and further apart 
geographically, which could cause access problems, 
especially for those with constrained finances or in 
more rural areas. 
Judge retention and attraction 
A specialized court may have limited appeal for a 
judge seeking to advance his or her career. Most of the 
highly prestigious judicial appointments are seats on 
general benches such as in Courts of Appeal or the 
Federal administration. The ability to recruit and 
retain high-quality judges may be limited except for 
those with a special interest in the area.26 Judges with 
special interests in malpractice litigation may bring 
agendas to their decisions that favor plaintiffs or 
defendants.  
Lessons from other countries 
Other countries have different medical liability 
systems than the US: Sweden, New Zealand, and 
Denmark, among others, have been studied. A feature 
of New Zealand’s system is a move away from a 
‘negligence standard’ compensation for injury arising 
from medical error or “medical mishap” and toward 
the use of the term “treatment injury” to describe an 
outcome that is not an “ordinary” part of treatment. 
New Zealand’s system is similar to, but not quite, a “no 
fault system”.12 A lawyer is not needed to file a claim, 
but a physician or hospital is needed. It not only 
covers a broader range of injuries than the US tort 
negligence-based system, but surprisingly, it also costs 
less. This may be due to technical factors such as 
universal health coverage and lack of a “collateral 
source” rule exclusion in those countries, so that 
expenses covered by outside means are deducted from 
the awards. Whether such a system would work in the 
US is unclear due to greater US cultural heterogeneity, 
more litigious legal traditions, and a non-centralized, 
non-government-run healthcare system.12 
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Sweden’s health care system is a socialized medicine 
single payer model with most health care provided by 
publicly funded hospitals or providers on government 
contract and a complex social welfare system that 
covers 80% of lost wages due to illness or injury,12 
something not covered in the US by health insurance. 
A mutual insurance company (LOF) owned by the 
county and regional government may provide 
additional compensation to injured patients above and 
beyond existing government benefits after evaluating 
the individual merits.  Providers are required to 28
purchase insurance via this mutual insurance 
company. Non-economic damages are capped. Those 
not satisfied by the mutual insurance company 
decision can appeal to a patient claims panel but 
would need to prove injury was “avoidable.”28 
Denmark’s system is similar to Sweden’s. By law 
(Patient Injury Act of 1992) regional hospital 
authorities are obligated to pay malpractice award 
costs.27 A regional association of hospitals and 
insurers evaluate claims in a manner similar to 
Sweden. 
Conclusions  
The American medical malpractice tort system: 
• a) is cumbersome and costly. 
• b) is lengthy, with approximately three years to 
resolution for most cases.  
• c) brings only a small fraction of medical injuries to 
litigation, in part because it is difficult for the 
plaintiff to truly know if malpractice has occurred. 
• d) is imperfect in that at least 15% of litigants who 
very likely had injuries from negligence are not 
compensated, while a similar percentage of those 
who were probably not victims of negligence are 
compensated.22 
If the system for filing and litigating claims were 
simpler, such as with proposed health courts 
analogous to the Workmen’s Compensation system, it 
is likely that a much larger percentage of patients who 
were injured by medical negligence would be 
compensated but at a lower rate than is currently the 
case. 
A specialty court system that establishes a more 
precise precedent body of law for standards of care for 
various illnesses would result in greater uniformity of 
decision making, greater predictability and 
consequently greater faith in the system from both 
healthcare practitioners and patients. 
The elimination of juries is controversial. In decision-
making that hinges on complex medical issues, where 
competing experts are selected for how much their 
opinion is likely to help one side, and where those 
experts serve different masters, it is likely that more 
good would be gained than lost by eliminating juries 
and substituting expert judges to be the trier of facts. I 
conclude that, given the existing problems with 
medical malpractice litigation and little likelihood that 
this problem will improve if the system is left alone, 
health care courts would be a significant asset in 
administering justice and equity to injured parties.  
It also would discourage, or at least rapidly dispose of, 
suits with little real basis that currently lead to 
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